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1.  Starting point of reform and general features of 
 development 
 Estonia 
1 has adopted the one of the most radical programs of stabilization and 
transformation amongst not only the former Soviet Union countries but among 
previously centrally planned economies as well.  
  The commodity and service markets were balanced mainly through the price 
liberalization and introduction of the internally convertible national currency. This 
was supplimented with the austerity in public consumption and surpluss in the state 
budget. The changes were also associated with a radical shift in the foreign trade 
rearientation. The economy that previously was oriented to almost costless recources 
from the former Soviet Union and work mostly for the Soviet "markets" seems to be 
very well adjusted to western markets and broad participation in the world economy. 
  The above mentioned radical changes brought about a serious decline in the 
economy (Tab.1). The real decline started in 1990 when the growth rate of GDP 
reached -6.5. In 1991 this magnitude decreased by 13.6%. This was followed by 
additional drop in 1992 of 18%. Some stabilization was attained in 1993 when the 
further decline of GDP was equal 2%. The data from the first half of 1994 indicate  5-
6% growth rate increase comparing to analogeus period of 1993. 
  Much further crisis touched the industrial production. For the four consecutive 
years i.e. from 1990 to 1993 the production shrinked by consequently 1.3, 9, 39 and 
27 per cents.  
                                              
1 Basic information about Estonia: 
1. Estonians belong to to the Baltic-Finnic group of the Finno-Ugric peoples as do the Finns and 
Hungarians. They arrived on the territory of Estonia in the third millennium BC. 
2. Estonia has a population of 1,565,662 (1989), 71.6 % live in urban centres. Ethnic omposition: 
 -Estonians  (61.5%) 
 -Russians  (30.3%) 
 -Ukrainians  (3.1%) 
 -Byelorussians  (1.8%) 
3. State language -Estonian 




5. Administratively Estonia is devided into 15 counties and 6 towns. The capital is Tallinn of 481,500 
(1991) 
6. Currency: Estonian kroon (=100 sents) 
7. Political system: The November 16,1988 Declaration on the sovereignty of the Estonian SSR 
established the Estonian SSR. The November 12 1989 the Supreme Soviet declared the 1940 
agression as a military occupation and annexation. The July 22 1940 resolution on Estonia Joining the 
USSR was declared null. On May 8, 1990 the officia name of the state is Republic of Estonia. The 
101 member Suprime Council is the highest continually active legal body of the state authority. The 
SC is elected for 5 years. The head of the government (prime minister) is nominated by the SC. The 
Prime Minister presents ministerial candidates to the SC for approval. Jarosław Bauc 
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  The inflation in the second quarter of 1992 (just before indroducing the 
currency reform) was 51%. At the same time procuction prises grew by 139% (fig.1). 
In the last two quarters of 1992 inflation (CPI) reached 64% and 25%. After that the 
stabilization effects appeared lowering inflation considerably. I993 inflation was 
equal 32.6%. The inflation is then still high but as one estimates it is pushed ahead 
mostly by the world market prices. This is due to quite considerable overshooting in 
the exchange rate at the beginning of the currency reform that caused a supply shock 
leading  to a further inflation. This view is also supported by the fact that during the 
period of stabilization and transformation PPI has been exceeding a CPI index (Fig.1) 








































































































































  Foreign trade has been totally liberalized. As a result the Estonian economy 
became very much open. In 1993 the share of exports contributed to 67% of the GDP. 
There are almost no restrictions or protectionist import barriers. The same extend of 
libaralization relates to financial markets. Inflow of foreign capital is favoured. There 
are no restrictions on capital exports. Foreign investors may withdraw their profits 
anytime or reinvest them in Estonia (Tab.1).  
  The currency reform of June 20, 1992 gained high degree of credibility. 
International reserves of the Bank of Estonia have increased signifficantly (Tab.1). 
This fact in the framework of a currency board system resulted in fast growth of 
money supply that was propelled mainly by the influx of foreign capital and Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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investment. During 1993 both M1 and M2 (also the domestic part of M2 i.e. M2(E)) 
grew 2 times (Fig.2). This growth was halted in 1994 and was replaced by an almost 
stable level of monetary aggregates. 
  The balance of payments was in surplus in 1993 thanks to the net capital 
inflow which offset the deficit in the current account that apeared in the last quarter of 
1993 and also at the beginning of 1994 (Tab.1). 
 
Tab.1          Basic indicators of economic performance 
 
  As far as the banking sector is concerned there was a signifficant crisis in 
1993. One of the leading commercial banks run into bankruptcy while two others 
were merged and eventually bailed out by the government. Interests rates on deposits 
and loans have been declining and there have been some signs of revitalization of 
credit market. The share of loans given to private sector has been increasing. The role 
played by the state owned enterprises declines in this respect. 
  There has also been signifficant change in the ownership structure. A decisive 
majority of enterprises in the fields  of trade, public catering and services have been 
privatized. It is associated with a large amount of new enterprises that have recently 
been established. By June 1994 there were above 75,000 units registered. Only 7,000 
of them belong to the state and 1,780 to municipalities. It is also worth mentioning 
that the number of enterprises and institutions owned partly by foreigners exceeded 





















Industrial output (Jan. 1993 
prices, EEKmill.) 
4348 3802 4001 3499 2609 2689 2844 3283  2922 2604
CPI  (IQ  92=1)  1,00 1,51 2,48 3,12 3,41 3,65 3,84 4,15  4,86 5,52
PPI  (IQ  92=1)  1,00 2,39 3,02 3,92 4,55 4,86 5,20 5,55  6,47 8,47
Current Account (EEK mill, 
IIQ 92=IQ+IIQ) 
 961 591 287 403 193 416  -519  -1071 
Capital Account (EEK mill, 
IIQ 92=IQ+IIQ) 
 -392 178 -125 672 412 762  701  934 
Direct investments (EEK 
mill.) 
 212 158 335 454 367 608 700  551 
International reserves (EEK 
mill.) 
  780 1739 2502 3061 3720 4507 5237  5296 5266Jarosław Bauc 
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2.  Stabilization package in Estonia 
2.1.  Soviet Union's inheritance 
 
  The final collapse of Soviet central planning in 1990-1991 brought about   
widespread disruptions in trade leading to shortages in goods and raw materials, loss 
of exports markets, disfunctioning of payments and monetary arragements and a 
￿wait and see￿ attitude among enterprise managers. At the same time galoping 
inflation severly cut households￿ real balances that together with price liberalization 
started to eliminate the shortages. In Estonia the 210,6% inflation in 1991 reduced the 
stock of cash and deposits held by households by about 75% of its real value. 
  In 1991 Estonia faced also the terms of trade shock after the Soviet Union had 
collapsed loosing about 10% of GDP. The overal drop in GDP reached in 1991 13% 
after declining in 1990 by 3.6%. 
  All these signs of instability and general chaos in the ruble zone did not leave 
much scope for a gradualist approach to stabilization. Model that was adopted in 
Estonia seems to have been the baldest not only among the former Soviet Union 
countries but possibly among the Central and Eastern Europe states as well.      
 
2.2.  Currency and exchange rate reforms 
 2.2.1. First steps of currency reform 
  An introduction of a new own currency was understood as an indispensable 
element of independent monetary system. The need to grant economic authomomy in 
Estonia apeared in August 1987. It stressed the need to introduce a convertible 
currency and clear accounts with other Soviet Union regions. 
  The accelerating inflation based on inflationary rouble that discredited itself in 
every respect as a currency together with an accute cash crisis gave another push to 
the spread of the idea of national currency. In the spring 1988 the Estonian SSR 
government formed official work groups to elaborate the concept of economic 
independence including creation of national monetary system. 
  There were several ideas all included an accomplishment of three goals
2: 
-elimination of inflationary impacts from the East, 
-guaranteeing an equivalent exchange based on market forces, 
-conquering the cash crisis. 
                                              
2 See: Kallas S., Sorg M., Currency reform in Estonia, Estonian Academy of Sciences, Institute of 
Economics, Reform Round Table Working paper No 9, Tallinn, May 1994. Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
  - 7 -  CASE Foundation 
  The first proposal, based on the experience of Soviet Union monetary reform 
in 1922, stipulated simultaneous circulation of two currencies - inflationary rouble 
and inflation-free koru. This solution however could not have secured the stability of 
a national currency. At the end of 1989 a proposition appeared to announce the 
Finnish mark FIM for the official legal tender. This was to assure stability and also 
reffered  to old experiences of 1918 when the Finnish currency was in circulation in 
the newly independent Estonia. The additional argument concerned the fact that the 
Finnish money circulated in mass in Estonia at that time.  
  More realistic concept of regulation of the Estonian monetary system was 
elaborated by an international group suggesting introducing the currency board 
principle. It was based on the idea of taking a loan of SEK 600 million from Sweeden 
for the reserve assets of the new Kroon. New currency EEK was to be fully backed 
with gold and foreign currency reserve. For many political and also practical reasons 
(unsolved problem of getting the loan etc), this idea was also rejected.   
2.2.2. Price liberalization 
  Implementation of the new currency required former price liberalization. Price 
reform started in late 1989. In this reform the government allowed changes in prices 
to be initiated by enterprises. Control over price setting  at the whosale and retail level  
for a wide range of goods was retained. At first prices of paper product, furniture and  
vegetables were decontrolled. In October 1990, prices of food were raised 
administratively and later subsidies on energy, telecomunication and transport were 
reduced. In July prices of milk, meat and several other consumer goods were 
deregulated. At the end of 1991 prices of 10% of the consumer basket remained under 
government price fixing procedure while other 30% were under some administrative 
regulation. All other prices were more or less free and their movement reflected 
supply and demand conditions on the market. Further deregulation took place within 
the framework of the stabilization package. By the end of 1992 the price liberalization 
process was virtually completed. 
  2.2.3. Implementation of the currency reform 
  On the basis of  theoretical discussions  the Bank of Estonia formed in July 
1990 8 work groups for the elaboration of the comprehensive currency reform system 
accompanied by relevant laws. In order to strenght the operativeness the Currency 
Reform Committee was set up in March 1991. It had been delegated great powers like 
the right to issue decrees concerning preperation and implementing the currency 
reform that was equal to the resolution of the Parliament. The final version of the 
reform reffered to the mentioned above concept of a currency board. The Estonian 
version of a currenc y board boils down to the following elements
3: 
                                              
3 Pure version of the currency board solution requires only for the money in circulation to be fully 
backed by the international reserve stock. Jarosław Bauc 
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1.  The Estonian kroon i.e. cash in circulation, demand and fixed time deposits 
have to be completely backed with gold and convertible currency reserves of the 
Bank of Estonia. 
2.  The Kroon has a fixed exchange rate for the Deutschmark at the parity 8:1. The 
Krown floats against all other currencies. 
3.  The Bank of Estonia has no right to devalue the Kroon. Devaluation requires a 
law to be passed by the parliament. 
4.  The Bank of Estonia has to ensure free convertibility of the Kroons against 
foreign currencies with respect to both current and capital account transactions. 
  The reform based on these principles came into existence in June 1992. Estonia 
was then the first country  of the former Soviet Union to introduce its own national 
currency. 
2.2.4. Wood backed reform 
  The fixed exchange rate system especially in Estonian version requires 
sufficient stock of gold and foreign exchange. After declaring in 1991 the Bank of 
Estonia the legal succesor of the central bank that existed before Soviet annexation in 
1940 11 tons of gold kept in Great Britain, Sweden and Switzerland were restored as 
gold reserves of Bank of Estonia. In order for the currency be fully backed one 
estimated  the lack required reserves of additional l20 mln USD. The problems   
regarding obtaining such an amount forced the Estonian Supreme Council to commit 
into the balance of the Bank of Estonia reserve area from the state forest with the 
estimated value of $150 mln. In other words the central bank received at its disposal 
the total of 150 thousand cubic meters of forests ready for felling which can be sold 
for supplementing the gold and foreign currency reserves of the Estonian kroon in the 
event of crisis! 
2.2.5. Erhard (German) pattern 
  From the technical point of view the most decisive stage of the currency 
reform was the withdrawal of rubles from circulation and replacement with the 
national currency. Every citizen could exchange up to 1500 rubles for 150 EEK. 
Above this magnitude the exchange rate was 50 rubles/EEK which effectively 
restrained the potencial flow of inflationary rubles from east across the border.  At the 
exchange rate 10:1 demand and fixed term deposits were exchanged. As a result 
every resident exchanged on average EEK 100 and average saving after the reform 
was EEK 220 i.e. DEM 28! per person. 
2.3.  Credibility assessment of the stabilization program 
  Following the implementation of the stabilization program inflation in Estonia 
decelerated rapidly suggesting gaining credibility. Although important the disinflation 
process itself should be supported by other measures of credibility. The extend to Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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which the credibility is confirmed allows to derive conclussions about the main 
directions of transformation process
4. 
  Here the attention will be paid to supporting the view of gaining credibility by 
evaluating the risk involved in the exchange rate and by appreciating the costs of 
disinflation
5.  
  For the economy with a free capital movement the concept of interest parity 
must hold. The interest rate differential is then justified by expected rate of 
devaluation. In other words if domestic and foreign interest rates differ that difference 
is covered by the risk premium the public sets on the exchange rate. It turns out that 
comparing the Bank of Estonia 28 day certificates of deposits for which the annual 
interest rate fluctuates closely around 5.5% or Estonia￿s interbank market interest rate 
(around 5.6%) to analogues interest rates in Germany to which the Estonian currency 
is pegged no statistically signifficant difference appears. That suggests full credibility 
of the Estonian currency
6. 
  The next measure that confirms high credibility of Estonian way of stabilizing 
the economy concerns the costs of dissinflation. As a rule the less credible policy the 
higher the so called sacrifice ratio indicating a loss in production caused by a given ( 
in our example - 100%) decrease in inflation (Tab.2 ).  
   As we can see the sacrifice ratio has been low and relatively stable since the 
first quater of 1993 when 100% decline in inflation caused only 3,05% drop in GDP. 
During second and third quarters it was even subject to reduction which means 
growing confidence in this kind of policy. In turn in the last quarter of 1993 and 
during the first half of 1994 one can observe rising level of the sacrifice ratio. This 
process may indicate that the program is slightly loosing its reliability. Despite this 
fact it seems that further disinflation should not entail any substancial drop in real 
                                              
4 Hansson and Sachs in: Hansson A., Sachs, J., Monetary Institutions and Credible Stabilization: A 
Comparison od Experiences in the Baltics, University of Chicago Law School, April, 1994 suggest 
that for small open in terms of current and capital accounts economy with fixed exchange rate regime 
which well fit to the Estonian case gaining credibility of stabilization implies fulfilling the following  
list of eight conditions 
1.  lower nominal interest rates, 
2.  lower ex post real interest, 
3.  smaller spreds between deposits and lending rates, 
4.  less of a bildup off of bad debts in the banking system, 
5.  greater growth of money demand, 
6.  longer-term maturities of the central bank lending, 
7.  a faster bildup of foreign exchange reserves, 
8.  faster recovery in GDP and industrial production. 
  Examining these hypotheses for Estonian case they ￿find most of them to be strongly 
confirmed in data: the currency board arragements in Estonia seem to have contributed to enhenced 
credibility of the stabilization program.￿ (p. 13).  
 
5 See: Saavalainen T.,  Stabilization in the Baltic Countries: A Comparative Analysis, Annual 
meetings of the Allied Social Science Associations, Washington, D.C., January 6, 1995. 
  
6 The interesting fact is that much bigger interest rate differentials one can observe in Latvia where 
the inflation in the first half of 1994 was even lower then in Estonia. That also supports the 
proposition that Estonia￿s currency board has contributed importantly to enhenced credibility of 
macroeconomic stabilization.  Jarosław Bauc 
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GDP
7. If this cost of disinflation remains an additional 10% reduction in inflation 
should not cost more then 0,4% of an additional drop in GDP.  
 
Tab.2          The sacrifice ratio  
 
3.  Foreign trade reorientation 
  From the socialist period Estonia inherited Soviet market oriented economy. 
Thus, the share of former Soviet republics was more than 90% of Estonian esports 
while the share of imports exceeded 80%. In 1980s the foreign trade was in deficit. 
The restoration of Estonia’s independence coincided with the increase in the 
difficulties in the Soviet economy
8 Those problems specially touched the trade of 
fuels and raw materials. There were also many attempts made to blockade both the 
trade and banking and money transers as well
9 The year 1990 was the last year of so 
called stagnation period characterized by a rigit set of rules covering both with 
commodity groups and trade partners which had been forced upon Estonian foreign 
trade for a long period of time. 
  In 1991 Estonia fulfilled its agreements with the former Soviet Republics in 
terms of exports. On the other hand the imports from that region dropped dramatically 
which implied a positive balance of foreign trade. Despite, Russia and former Soviet 
republics remained main trade partners in 1991. Changes that took place in the year of 
deepening economic instability 1991 did not in fact exert any noticable influence on 
foreign trade.The decisive break occured in 1992.  
                                              
7 The same procedure applied to remaining Baltic states produces much higher sacrifice ratios. 
8 See: Gaidar’s Program, CASE, Warsaw, May 1993.  
9 See: T. Rajasalu, Estonian Economy: Spring 1993, Estonian Academy of Science, Institute of 
Economics Report 1, Tallinn, June 1993. 









SR Change   
in SR 
3Q 92  -4,9 -4,9  139 -3,53  
4Q 92  -9,1 -14  94 -14,89 -11,37 
1Q 93  -8,4 -22,4  -735 3,05 17,94 
2Q 93  -3,6 -26  -893 2,91 -0,14 
3Q 93  -0,5 -26,5  -967 2,74 -0,17 
4Q 93  -3,7 -30,2  -990 3,05 0,31 
1Q 94  -8,1 -38,3  -984 3,89 0,84 
2Q 94  -0,4 -38,7  -978 3,96 0,06 Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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  At the beginning of 1992 the difficulties in Russian economy escalated. It was 
associated with imposing by Russia exports quotas and licencing. Liberalization of 
prices for raw materials and fuel in Russia resulted in a big jump of prices in Estonia 
during the first half of 1992. The terms of trade deteriorated by over 30% or by over 
10% of GDP. Due to very high dependency of the former Soviet Union Estonia 
experienced much higher losses then East European countries after dissolution of 
CMEA. For instance estimates for Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia show the 
terms of trade shock in 1991 ranged between 3 and 5.5 % of GDP. 
Tab.3          The breakdown of the foreign trade in 1992 in Estonia 
 
  The figures in table 3 reflect two important features of Estonian economy 
before systemic crucial changes and trade reorientation. Firstly, the inflaction that 
made both exports and imports ten times larger in 1992 comparing to 1991 also 
changed the price structure. The new price system bettered the terms of trade 
particularly in 1991 signifficantly. Secondly we can see Estonia’s dependence on 
imported fuel and energy. The negative balance of their (-853 mln kroons) is almost 
equal to positive balance of all the remaining imports and exports (951 mln kroons).  
  In the first quarter of 1992 the foreign trade was practically blocked. Missing 
shipments to Russian fuel were replaced with loans and aid from the West, 
particularly from Nordic states.  
  Under such unfavourable circumstances Estonia started to reorient on western 
markets. It relates both to trade structure and trade partners (tables 4 and 5). 
  Looking at Estonian foreign trade by commodities one can distinguish three 
groups.  
  First, commodities that have given a positive balance during the whole period. 
Traditionally those were products of animal origin (meet and dairy products). Several 
types of manufactured goods must be included here as well (group 12, tab.4). It 
particularly comprises furniture, sports equipment, toys etc. During this period 
Estonia also earned foreign trade revenues from exporting timber, paper and products 











1990 262 342 -18 -61 -79 
1991 510 445 -26 91 65 
1992 5232 5134 -853 951 98 
Source: Bank of Estonia, Quarterly Review 1993:1. Jarosław Bauc 




Tab.4          The reorientation of trade by products 
  % of TOTAL  BALANCE 
 Eksport  Import  mln  kroons 
 1990  1991 1992 1990 1991 1992 1990 1991  1992 
1. Live animals, products of 
animal origin 
7.3 10.0 10.2 1.0 1.1 0.5 16 46  506 
2. Products of vegetable 
origin 
1.0 0.9 0.9 7.6 10.1 1.7 -23 -40 -40 
3. Animal and vegetable fats 
and oils 
12.6 7.4 5.4 6.3 6.6 6.5 12 8 -44 
4. Mineral products  3.2  5.2 11.2 7.5 12.0 28.0 -18 -27  -853 
5. Chemical products  14.0  15.7 7.5 16.8 11.5 7.6 -21 30  13 
6. Wood, paper, paper 
products 
4.7 5.9 13.9 2.2 2.4 3.9 5 20  524 
7. Textiles  24.5  26.4 13.8 23.1 19.0 7.8 -14 50  321 
8. Footwear, headgear  3.4  1.9 1.0 2.6 1.9 1.1 0 1  -3 
9. Metals  3.8  3.6 13.5 10.0 9.4 4.7 -25 -24  467 
10. Machinery equipment  10.1  11.6 5.5 12.7 14.0 18.7 -17 -3  -669 
11. Transport equipment  1.3  1.0 6.5 3.4 3.8 13.8 -8 -12  -368 
12. Other manufactured 
goods 
14.1 10.4 10.6 6.8 8.2 5.7 14 16  244 
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 -79 65  98 
 Source: Bank of Estonia, Quarterly Review 1993:1. Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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Tab.5          Reorientation of trade by partners   
Source: Bank of Estonia, Quarterly Review 1993:1.
  % of TOTAL  BALANCE 
 Eksport  Import  EEK  mill 
 1990 1991 1992 1990 1991 1992 1990  1991  1992
1. CIS (inc. Latvia, 
Lithuania) 
94.0 94.8 41.8 82.0 84.7 40.9 -33.6  105.9  88.9
2. CIS (excl. Latvia 
Lithuania) 
85.2 83.3 30.2 74.1 73.3 37.8 -29.6  98.2  -360.0
Russia 55.1  56.5 17.7 51.8 45.9 32.5 -32.4  83.9  -742.1
Ukraine 13.2  12.9 5.7 7.7 7.9 2.3 8.2  30.4  181.0
Belarus 4.6  4.1 1.1 4.4 4.9 1.7 -3.0  -0.9  -30.2
3. Latvia  5.7  7.7 10.3 4.7 5.1 1.4 -1.2  16.6  467.8
4. Lithuania  3.1  3.8 1.3 3.2 6.3 1.7 -2.8  -8.9  -18.9
5. Finland  1.1  2.3 24.3 1.6 2.0 29.4 -2.5  3.0  -240.2
6. Germany  0.3  0.2 4.3 2.3 0.8 7.6 -6.9  -2.7  -163.8
7. Sweden  0.4  0.5 9.0 0.1 0.8 6.6 0.6  -0.8  135.0
8. Other West-European 
countries 
0.5 1.0 11.5 2.9 2.4 8.5 -9.8 -5.2  170.0
9. USA and Canada  0.6  0.1 2.1 3.2 3.7 3.5 -2.6  -15.8  -64.0
10. Other countries  3.1  1.1 7.0 7.9 5.6 3.5 -24.5  -19.6  172.5
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 -79.3 64.8 98.4Jarosław Bauc 
CASE Foundation  - 14 - 
made of wood and paper. This, except timber which became the most important 
source of foreign trade revenue, did not change in 1992. 
  The second group includes commodities having traditionally given a nagative 
balance in Estonian foreign trade. It specially relates to fuels (group 5, tab.4) that 
steeply increased their negative balance during 1990-1992. Similar situation concerns 
machinary and transport equipment and products of vegetable origin. The difference 
between export and import increased most notably in the group of transport 
equipment. 
  The third group embraces goods that sometimes show positive, sometime 
negative foreign trade balance. First of all one has to mention metals (metals and 
metal products) where their import traditionally exceded export. In 1992 Estonia 
became metal net exporting country. 
  Summing up it should be stressed that at the beginning of deep reforms the 
structure of trade balance started adjusting to new requirements. Anyway it was far 
from being rational. Commodities that had no direct link to local manufacturing 
industries played a far too important role (metal trading, timber felling). 
  Changes affecting Estonian foreign trade partners in 1992 seem to have been 
much greater then changes with respect to commodities. Estonia started to look for 
new trade partners in the West in order to avoid the risk connected to the East trade. 
Enterprises which had oriented to the CIS markets faced deep difficulties. Not all 
could sell their products on western markets. The substitution of cheap raw materials 
and fuel imported previously from Russia with those bought from western markets 
caused an intolerable cost increase and they turned out to be unprofitable. As a result 
the former Soviet Republics, especially Russia, lost their leading role. That region 
was mainly replaced by the trade with Finland. Export to other western countries, 
mostly Germany and Sweden was increasing as well. During 1992 exports to the 
West have been steadily outstripping exports to the East. The increase accelarated in 
the second half of 1992 after the monetary reform. 
4.  Banking system reform 
  Before World War II Estonia had a well-functioning banking system. Apart the 
central bank - the Bank of Estonia there were three types of financial establishments 
operated within the system: commercial banks, which were the biggest and most 
universal, city banks and loan and saving societies. 
  The discussions of necessity and possibility of creating Estonian own banking 
system started in the autumn 1987. A year later the first commercial bank in the 
Soviet Union was established in Tartu. Thus, the creation of an independent banking 
system started well before political independence was regained. The initiators of the 
new banking system were managers of Estonian enterprises and private enterpreneurs, 
whose activities were the most severly hindered by the existing banking system. The 
initiative coming from below was supported by local politicians and at the end of 
1989 there were six independent commercial banks. A year later this amuont doubled. Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
  - 15 -  CASE Foundation 
They were responsible for 20% of loans granted in Estonia at that time. Furthermore, 
they caused a rise in competition providing alternative opportunities for borrowing, 
saving and quality of services. Simultaneously five branches of all-Union banks 
continued operation. 
  The next step was the struggle to seperate the branches of all-Union banks and 
incorporate them into an independent banking system of Estonia. At the end of 1989 
the USRR gave the Baltic states economic autonomy and transferred the branches of 
the all-Union banks under the administration of the governments of these republics. 
The process of the banks’ gaining independence was however not free of problems 
and controvercies. The problem of parallel central banks was resolved on 31 
December 1991 when the Tallinn Branch of the Gosbank stopped its operation. This 
fact made it possible to emarge a ￿two-tier￿ system from previously existed 
monobank. This system was completed in May 1992 with the transfer of all 
remaining commercial functions to the new North-Estonian Joint-Stock Bank which 
was 100% owned by the Bank of Estonia. 
  In the meantime a financial chaos and galloping inflation in the ruble zone 
reduced the real value of the obligatory initial capital of banks several times. By the 
mid-1992, the 5 million ruble threshold was equivalent to less then 40,000 USD. In 
such an environment banking became a very lucrative business. The possibility of 
exploiting an arbitrage in foreign exchange trading was the easiest way and main 
source of banking profits. Therefore in 1992 one could observe a boom of setting up 
new commercial banks. In the first half of that year 21 banks were issued a licence. At 
the end of 1992 the total number of commercial banks in Estonia was 42.  
4.1.  The Bank of Estonia and consolidation of the banking 
system 
  The Bank of Estonia was founded at the en d of 1989. The main task the bank 
was obliged to fulfil was to create the banking system, secure economic 
souvereinghty and restore normal funtioning of the market economy. The Bank of 
Estonia started with modest financial resources. As of January 1991 its capital stock 
was only 10 million roubles while according to the norm it should have had 400 
million!. It tried to improve its possition by direct crediting and tried to incorporate 
some commertial banks too. After improving its finance the bank stopped direct 
crediting except crediting of banks. As it was already mentioned in June 1992 the 
Board of Foreign Transactions broke off from the Bank of Estonia to form an 
idependent North-Estonian Bank. At the same time with the help of EBRD (25% of 
shares) The Estonian Investment Bank was formed as a separate unit. 
  The explosive growth of commercial banks resulted in establishment of banks 
that were not satisfactory. The average capital stock at the end of 1992 was EEK 5 
millions (625,000 DEM). Some of them did not operate professionally and had 
difficulties in staying luiquid. If we add a deep crisis of the whole economy in terms Jarosław Bauc 
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of a GDP decline we will get the basic roots of banking crisis the economy was 
facing. 
  In 1993 prudencial ratios and deadlines for reaching them were established. 
For new banks they are following: 
-8%   minimum solvency ratio (bank’s own funds to the sum of risk adjusted  
 assets), 
-30%  minimum liquidity ratio (liquid assets to current liabilities), 
-800%  upper limit on risk concentration (sum of debts of high risk      
  concentration customers to the bank’s net assets), 
50%   maximum loan available to any one customer to bank’s own funds. 
  For already functioning banks new capital stock minimum deadline is: 
-EEK 15,000,000 by 1 April 1995, 
-EEK 25,000,000 by 1 April 1996, 
-EEK 35,000,000 by 1 April 1997. 
  All these steps together with a liquidation of some banks and not issuing new 
licences to others made some banks to merge. At the beginning of 1994 there were 21 
operating commercial banks i.e. a half of the number of banks functioning at the end 
of 1992. The process of banking sector recovering presents a table 6. 



























1 Q 1993  4152  1369 366 37.2 10.1 
2 Q 1993  4611  1682 548 34.2 11.1 
3 Q 1993  5553  2586 606 29.7 7.9 
4 Q 1993  6396  3024 680 25.4 6.8 
Source: Sort M., Banking reform in Estonia, Estonian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics, 
Reform Round Table Working paper No 10, Tallinn, May 1994. Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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  Since 1992 there is no limits put on allowing foreign capital into Estonian 
Banks.  
 
4.2.  Selected issues in banking reform 
4.2.1. The liquidity crisis 
  One of the negative side effects of the currency reform was worsening the 
functioning of the paynments system. For instance the average transfer by Union 
Baltic Bank taking 4 days in September 1992 lasted 1 month by November 1992. 
Attempts of the Bank of Estonia to reduce delays through short term liquidity loans 
exerted no perceptible impact
10  It turned out that banks with substantial bad assets or 
mismatched terms of assets and liabilities could remained liquid from profits earned 
from foreign exchange, or by onlending cheap central bank credits at much higher 
interest rate
11 The currency reform unifying the exchange rates reduced spreads and 
cut the profits. In addition the adopted model of stabilization prohibiting the Central 
Bank from financing commercial banks stopped the regular access to soft credits. The 
monetary reform revealed problems of weak balance sheets stating a combination of 
loans in arrears, loans contracted at very low interest rates and losses on foreign 
exchange operations
12. Banks played well known Ponzi scheme in which depositors 
who placed their money early enough to withdraw it earned quite signifficant returns 
while those coming later carried losses. Therefore some banks being aware of its 
current situation were in a strong opposition regarding introducing the currency 
reform. This problem particularly touched three banks whose deposit liabilities 
constituted in that time about 40% of M2.  Among others two there was also a sign of 
a national pride i.e. the first commercial bank in the Soviet Union (Tartu Bank). The 
authorities exhibited large degree of determination closing the Tartu Bank with no 
rescue of depositors and merged the other two with only partial bailout. Also  two 
other smaller banks have been forced to go into bankruptcy with no bailout of 
depositors.  
4.2.2. Bad debts 
  The potencial of bad debt problem was in some sense solved by inflation that 
erased the existing debt overhang. The CPI level of December 1993 exceeded 86 
times the third quater 1990 price level. Debts from the pre-reform period have then 
negligible real value. Many debtors and especially heavilly indebted firms have 
benefited more than they have lost due to currency reform shock. 
                                              
10 IMF Economic Review: Estonia, Washington 1993. 
11 Hanson A., Reforming the Banking System in Estonia, LSE/TEWS conference on "Banking 
Reform in FSU and Eastern Europe: Lessons from Central Europe", Budapest, 14-15 January 1994. 
12IMF Economic Review: Estonia, Washington 1993, p. 21.  Jarosław Bauc 
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  In fact the situation is not clear because of the accounting shortcomings. On 
the other hand there is no important evidence for this problem to be a real one. New 
strict rules of monetary policy exerted an impact on both firms and banks not to 
restore the size of credits granted recklessly with little if any credit analisis. 
 
5. Budgetary  reform 
  The budget reform is closely associated with the whole package of reforms 
especially with the tax and the monetary reform. At the same time it seems to deserve 
an independent treatment. 
  As the beginning of the budget reform can be regarded the late 80s when 
Estonia started to prepare for the transition along with the establishment of 
independence. The law of 1989 provided that every local government has its own 
independent budget. It also established the sources of revenues and expenditures of 
the state and local budgets. The most significant sign of determination to change the 
old budget was the liquidation of subsidies. In 1991 the social fund was subsidized by 
ca 50% of the actual needs. Later the share of subsidies decreased considerably. 
Similarly the maintenance of medical system and sickness benefits used to be entirely 
financed by the budget. But in 1992 the expenditures connected with public health 
were practically fully financed from the medical insuarance contribution into the sick 
funds.  
  In 1992 new system of local governments budget was enforced. According to 
these regulations budgets of communes and towns receive 100% of personal tax 
income, 35% of enterprise tax income, natural resource tax and other local taxes. This 
solution brought about signifficant differences among regions. Now all surplusses are 
collected by the central budget and reallocated to those of deficit. 
  The differences in revenue structure of budget, local budgets and and 
extrabudgetary funds  before and after reform shows the table 7. Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
  - 19 -  CASE Foundation 
Tab.7        Budget revenue structure before and after reform  
 
  Since 1992 there have been significant changes in the structures of state and 
local budgets (see tables 8 and 9). 







Enterprise income tax  18.8 20.3 17.1
Tax on fixed and current assets  5.2
Personal income tax  11.9 13.3 20.4
Turnover tax/VAT tax  36.6 15.6 21.4
Total excise tax  8.2 4.3
Social Tax  16.7 17.4
Medical insurance tax  10.5
Other taxes, duties and incomes  27.5 25.9 8.9
Source: Tang P., Niglo H., Budget Reform in Estonia, Estonian Academy of Sciences, Institute 
of Economics, Reform Round Table Working paper No 7, Tallinn, February 1994.  Jarosław Bauc 
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State budget revenues   
Corporate income tax  472 22,65 1032 24,86 584  16,45
Personal income tax  0,00 0,00 513  14,45
VAT 896 42,99 1994 48,04 1670  47,03
Excise duty  182 8,73 403 9,71 308  8,67
Revenue from state property   230 11,04 77 1,85 68  1,91
Revenue from local budgets  177 8,49 243 5,85   0,00
Total revenue  2084 100,00 4151 100,00 3551  100,00
State budget expenditures   
Finance of social sphere  791 39,04 1675 41,66 1285  41,48
Finance of national economy  388 19,15 606 15,07 494  15,95
Administration expences  120 5,92 260 6,47 266 8,59
Law and order maintenance  195 9,62 482 11,99 365 11,78
State defence  61 3,01 171 4,25 157  5,07
Other 147 7,26 30 0,75 94  3,03
Subsidies to local administrations  322 15,89 649 16,14 294  9,49
Total expenditure  2026 100,00 4021 100,00 3098  100,00
Surplas/deficit(-) 58 130 453 
Source:Statistical Yearbook 1993, Estonian Statistics Monthly No 7, 1994 Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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Tab.9          The local budget structure before and after reform  
 
  The currency board model implemented in Estonia with poorly developed 
capital market has made the both government budget and the local budgets be kept 
balanced or in surpluss. 
  It is also worth mentioning that pensions and child and family allowances are 
paid from a special extrabudgetary fund. Similarly the medical insurance expenditures 
(maintenance of medical institutions and illness compensations, child birth and taking 
care) is also financed from extrabudgetary health insurance fund. 
  In general the reallocation of resuorces made by the budgets (state and local) is 
surprisingly low and stable. Both in 1992 and 1993 there was about 30% of GDP 
reallocated through budget. 
5.1.  Tax system  
  At the outset of the tax system reform it was assumed that it should fullfil its 
classical functions 
1.  The fiscal function i.e. providing the state and local budgets with income needed 
for fulfilling their economic and social functions. 
2. The stimulative function i.e. stimulating of economic activity and business 
development. 
3.  The stabilizing function i.e. stabilization of the economy. 










Local budget revenue   
Corporate income tax  247 15,66% 5 0,18%   0,00%
Personal income tax  857 54,34% 1832 65,76% 505  44,81%
Subsidies from state budget  322 20,42% 617 22,15% 295  26,18%
Total revenue  1577 100,00% 2786 100,00% 1127  100,00%
Local budget expenditures   
Economy 442 30,21% 806 30,92% 225  22,98%
Social sphere  651 44,50% 1192 45,72% 570  58,22%
Administration 95 6,49% 223 8,55% 124  12,67%
Total expenditures  1463 100,00% 2607 100,00% 979  100,00%
Surplus 114 179 148 Jarosław Bauc 
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  At the beginning there was a confussion among enterprises whose budget 
(Soviet or Estonian) should be paid taxes. In 1991 new tax system was elaborated. It 
was aimed at creating an independent and save from inlation tax. The tax structure 
was thought so that the predominant role was played by indirect taxes. This has been 
achieved by establishing low rates of direct taxes (enterprise and individual income 
tax). Tax rates were kept low to create a situation where the former all-Union 
enterprises be interested in paying their taxes into the Estonian budget rather then into 
the Soviet one.  
  The structure of state taxes is following (table 10): 
  The new tax system was introduced in 1991 under conditions of high inflation 
and signifficant drop in GDP. Despite this both state and local budgets were kept 
balanced. It obviously happened at high social price. Since 1992 there have been 
essential changes in the state budget and the local budgets. The share of local budget 
in the total budget revenues kept declining from 43% in 1992 to 24% in first half of 
1994. However, introduction at the begining such a decentralized tax system was not 



















10%  18  18  Exemptions: social service, 
post service,drugs, termal 
energy 
Excises  up to 400%  up to 400%  up to 400%  levied on: alcohol, tobacco, 















proportional 26% proportional 
26% 
Before Jan 1994 100% to 
local budgets, after Jan. 
1994 52% local and 48% 
state budget. 1994 tax free 
income-3600 EEK. 
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0.7%-local budgets. tax 
base: land price  
Customs duty        except imported cars-10% 
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supported by a mechanism reallocating funds among different regions. The 
government decided then to make a step back by intervening in local activities as 
reallocation of the state budget resources over particular regions appeared 
unavoidable. Unlike 1992 and 1993 when part of the corporate tax was allocated to 
local budgets since the begining of 1994 all of it has gone to the state budget. At the 
same time personal income tax that previously was collected by local budgets was 
subject to split between state (48%) and local governments (52). Those changes in 
turn created a situation of insufficient local budgets. More than 85% of their income 
comes from personal income tax. The subsidies from the state budget equal  a half of 
their own incomes and a quarter of their total revenues. 
6. Labour  maket 
  The economic reforms have caused great changes in the labour market. Besides 
the economic changes the labour market formation has been influenced by: 
-enforcement of new law regulating labour relations, 
-changes in institutional structure of the labour market 
-shift in the trade unions’ role they played in the economy, 
-application of tripartite agreements (trade unions, employers and government). 
  Current processes so far have reflected only the beginning of labour market 
formation. Large scale privatization has not gone into full swing yet and the 
ownership and land reforms are in some intermediate stage. Also unemployment as a 
new social phenomenon has not touched the Estonian labour resource yet. 
6.1.  Labour market institutions 
6.1.1. Goverment 
  Within the governmet the elaboration and execution of social policy, including 
labour and income policy is regulated by the Estonian Ministry of Social Affairs 
(MSA). Under its administration the National Social Insurance Office was formed. 
Main tasks of MSA include planning of the whole social policy and solving social 
problems in the following principal spheres: 
-protection of people’s health and medical care, 
-employment and income policy, 
-social security and social insurance. Jarosław Bauc 
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  The work of unemployment local offices (40) has been passive so far, being 
limited to the registration of job-seekers and the unemployment and payment of 
benefits to them. Also training of the unemployed has played a minor role.  
6.1.2. Trade Unions 
  The trade union reform started in 1988-1989 together with the Trade Union 
Law. Although the law was adopted in the Soviet period it is still in force. The law 
established most generally recognized principles of international law like 
independence of the trade unions, freedom of joining the trade unions and so forth. 
Today there is 25 trade union federations that uniate about 50% of the labour force. 
Despite this fact there is a quite strong resistance among employees to be involved in 
the trade union work mainly due to their role they played during the socialist period. 
So far the main achievement is a preparation of the ratification of ILO conventions in 
the Parliament.  
  Since the employers (the third part of the institutional arragement) are 
practically not organized also the tripartite negotiations are at the very preliminary 
stage.  
6.2. Labour  supply 
  The employment rate of the population has always been relatively high. In 
1989 86.1% of working age population were engaged in the economy. This share 
dropped to 77% in 1994. This decline results from introducing ecomic reforms and 
general economic decline in Estonia. This shitf comprises pensioners whose share of 
being economically engaged decreased from 28.4% in 1990 to 18.2% in 1993 and 
studying young people whose share has risen.  
  The Estonian labour force is considered to be rather highly qualified. 15% of 
employees has higher, 30% secondary and 25% specialized secondary education. The 
certain part of professional structure of employment is not in harmony with the 
present labour market requirements (engineers in industrial specialties for instance).  
  Another characteristic feature of the labour market are regional differences. In 
some regions especially in Tallinn there is no unemployment at all. In others one 
estimates to be over 20%.  
  The workforce was ethnically divided between different regions of the country 
as well as sectors of economy. This is the result of decades of purposeful labor import 
to certain regions (North-Eastern industrial towns and Tallinn) and into certain 
branches and companies. The share of Estonians in the total workforce was 58.7% in 
1987. in industry the share of Estonians in the workforce was 42.8% (in the oil shale 
industry 17.1%). In agriculture there was 85.4%. Estonians prevail in education - 71% 
and in culture - 84%. Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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  More then one third of the total workforce is located in Tallinn. This is first 
and foremost connected with the concentration of new businesses emerging in the 
capital. 
  The territorial and professional mobility of working people is relatively 
limited. People are stuck to the place they happen to live. This is also connected with 
the early formative stage of housing market. 
6.3. Labour  demand 
  As far as the labour market is concerned the economic reforms essentially 
affected the labour demand side. In 1989-1994 the total number of employees 
decreased in manufacturing, agriculture and construction and increased in the service 
sector. This confirms the GDP structures by kinds of activity where the share of 
services icreased from 34% in 1992 to over 50% in 1994 (table 11). 
  
The labour demand exhibits the following features: 
-declining tendency, 
-overemployment in the state sector, 
-differences in labor demand by kinds of activity, occupations and regions, 
-mismatch between labour demand and vacancies. 
  The first  issue will be considered in the section concerning unemployment. 
The phenomenon of hidden unemployment in the state sector can be detected by 
Tab.11          GDP structure by kinds of activity 




Agriculture, forestry, fishing  19 11
Manufacturing 31 27
Power engineering  2 3
Constuction 7 7
Trade, catering, hotels  9 12
Transport, communication  10 9
Financial institutions  4 6
Social and personal services  17 25
Other 1 1
Source: Venesaar U.,Labour Market in Estonia, Estonian Academy of Sciences, Institute ofJarosław Bauc 
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comparison 60% decline in manufacturing and 45% decrease in employment. The 
enterprises that are facing the problem of privatization are not too much eager to 
reveal their excessive labour resources just in case of having troubles with hiring fired 
people again. The second reason is a slight rise in the manufactural production since 
third quater of 1993. On the other hand there has been announced over 5000 
vacancies where the firms cannot find suitable employees. This is a sign of a natural 
mismatch phenomenon during so severe reorientation. 
6.4. Unemployment 
  Unemployment or rather the lack of unemployment seems at the first sight not 
to fit to other results the Estonian economy produces. According to different measures 
applied to this issue there was 2-6.8% unemployment at the beginning of 1994. 
Despite some obvious tendencies during the period of recovery like a rise in industry 
or an acceleration in privatization process some other explanations deserve attention. 
Fortunatelly for the economy and statistcs some natural and exogenous factors are at 
work. 
1. Emigration.  Regained  independence  and the withdrawal of Russian troops 
from Estonian teritory made quite large amount of Russians leave or emigrate. Till 
beginning of 1994 more than 50,000 Russians emigrated. For the economy of 
630,000 working people it has had a substancial meaning.  
2.  Before 1991 there were some 28.4% share of pensioneers in the total number 
of employees. This category of employment droped by 10% to 18.2%. That means 
additional 60,000 people out of labour force with no sign of increasing 
unemployment! 
3.  It is also wort mentioning keeping, along with other fields of economy, strict 
liberal attitude towards unemployment benefits. Unemployment compensation and 
related social benefits have been remaining at levels which do not distort incentives 
for job search and skill enhacement. 
4.  Under the condition of high inflation and wage liberalization
13 wage rigitities 
generally tend to be small. That makes the labour market quite flexible. Hence, in the 
absense of strong trade unions there is no room for western European type insider-
outsider phenomena. 
7.  Ownership reform and privatization 
7.1.  First trials of privatization 
                                              
13 The Estonian government have so far been successful in resisting demands for wage and price 
indexatian scheme. Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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  By the middle of 1980s Estonian economy was centralized and highly 
concentrated. In the manufacturing sector 200 large state enterprises dominated, of 
which the majority were subordinated directly to Moscow. In transport and even in 
the service sector the share of state enterprises was nearly 100%. In agriculture there 
were approximately 300 farms of which 50% were state and other 50% cooperative 
(kolkhoz). 2/3 of dwellings represented state living space at that time.   
  The privatization in Estonia was not in the agenda until the beginning of 1990. 
In the privatization process a strategy of reforming that sphere step by step was a 
basic principle of Edgar Savisaar’s government. It was intended to start with 
commercialization, privatization of dwellings, small-scale units and some 
experimental privatization. In 1990 the special institution - Department of State 
Property was founded to carry out small and pilot privatization. First auctions of 
small units took place in March 1991. Similarly the leasing program and the 
commercialization process of state enterprises started at that time. This was also the 
period when the spontaneous privatization started in various forms. After an 
introduction of the new currency on June 20 1992 and adoption of basic laws (on 
competition, bankruptcy, etc.) the mass privatization of larger units was planned to 
start.  
7.2.  Debate on privatization principles 
  Passing the Law on the Fundamentals of the Ownership Reform in June 1991 
splited the political scene into supporters of predominantly political approach or 
economic approach to privatization process. The former one represented mainly by 
National Coalition Party ￿Fatherland￿ and National Independence Party placed the 
restitution of property rights and the general interest of Estonians in the front. They 
support radical and immediate transfer of state prperty into private ownership by 
means of vouchers. This approach negated the role of former ￿nomenklatura￿, 
foreigners of mostly Soviet origin. Also the Rural Center Party and Social Democrats 
gave priority to vauchers but delivered according to one￿s work contribution. The 
supporters of the latter approach wanted the restitution and compensation problems be 
separated from privatization. Sale was regarded as the main form of privatization 
while vauchers were basically rejected since they were considered as a mean of 
diffusion of property. 
  The economic approach predominated in the E. Savisaar government. It was 
also followed by T. Vahi government that came into power in January 1992. 
Controvercies concerning the basic way of privatization hampered the process of 
private ownership restitution. Most government￿s initiatives were rejected by the 
parliament which cut and dried among others the following programs:  
•  partial sale of the shares of state owned joint-stock companies, 
•  reorganization of state owned small scale enterprises, 
•  privatization of dwellings. Jarosław Bauc 
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  The last one was finally adopted in April 1992. This envisaged the introduction 
of the so called national capital vauchers in the process of privatization of dwellings.  
 
7.3.  Progress in privatization 
  After the parliamentary elections had taken place Mart Laar’s government was 
formed (September 1992). The coalition consisted of ￿Fatherland￿, Liberal 
Democrats, National Independence Party, Rural Center Party and Social Democrats. 
A series of laws and decrees were passed. This solved several important issues that 
hampered the privatization process previously. It gave some jump in the privatization 
field but because the coalition members had several different understandings about 
the ownership reform large privatization still proceded slower then desired. 
7.3.1. Small privatization 
  Till now the small privatization program has turned out to be the most 
successful one. There were two stages of this kind of privatization.  
  The first one lasted from January 1991 to May 1992 embraced objects whose 
book value did not exceed EEK 50,000 (slightly above DM 6,000). Foreigners were 
excluded from this sort of privatization.  
  The existing law granting the possibility for insiders to buy the property at 
initial price with the pre-emptive right to buy became unexpectedly wide-spread. 
Approximately 80% of objects were sold in this way while the real auction took place 
only in the case of about 10% cases. The rest was sold by means of tender 
(competition of business ideas).  
  Due to a wide-spread criticism relating mainly to preferences given to insiders 
second stage of small privatization started with adoption of the new law regulating 
this way of privatization on 21 May, 1992. First of all the range of objects was 
extended by rising the ceiling book value to EEK 600,000 and by widening the 
privatization to all branches. The range of obtainers eliglible to purchase the 
privatized property was also widened. This time all adult residents of Estonia and 
foreigners as well as joint-stock companies registered in Estonia were granted the 
right to take part in the privatization process. The lack of mortgage law complicated 
the possibility to obtain credits from banking sector. To alleviate this shortcoming 
buying by installments was introduced. 
  The process of small privatization is practically over. By December, 1993 the 
total sale price reached EEK 115.5 million and over 1200 objects were sold. Most of 
the privatized objects have been repaired, re-equipped with modern equippment and 
made generally much more attractive for customers. As a result all signs of   
competition emerged.  Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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7.3.2. Experimental privatization 
  This sort of privatization program was launched in spring/summer 1991. It was 
aimed at gaining experience and figuring out the suitability of different forms and 
procedures of privatization before introducing the large scale privatization. Object for 
this goal (7 enterprises) were chosen so as to function in different branches of 
industry, to be of various size (book value fixed assets ranged from 170,000 to 
20,255,800 rubles, and to be of different form (association, state-owned small 
enterprise, and large enterprises). Also different methods of privatization were 
applied.  
7.3.3. Large-scale privatization 
  Formally large-scale privatization started in August 1992 after two 
fundamental acts had been adopted
14. They were supposed to regulate the 
privatization of the objects with book value over EEK 600,000. In a charge of 
running the program Estonian Privatization Enterprise was established in September, 
1992. As a rule all enterprises i.e. around 250 industrial and appr. 150 from other 
spheres of economy have been reorganized into new forms like state-owned joint-
stock companies or lease enterprises.  
  The property to be privatized in this manner was to be sold in exchange for 
privatization securities (vauchers,  EEK or convertible currencies). Both Estonian and 
foreign citezens, physical and legal persons can participate in the privatization 
process. Privatization proceeds are allocated in the following way: 
1. 50% - into the Compensation Fund, 
2. 20% - at the disposal of the Estonian Government reserve fund for covering 
expenses of ownersip reforms, 
3. 10% - to supplement the Statutory Fund of the Bank of Estonia, 
4. 10% - into the special pension fund, 
5. 10% - into the special fund for supporting employment. 
  During 1993 and 1994 there was quite significant progress in the large scale 
privatization. In 1993 three international tenders were announced. Almost 400 
applications were submitted for 130 selected enterprises. The respose from Estonia 
and from abroad turned out to be unexpectedly large. As it was already mentioned the 
large scale privatization is one of the most sensitive issues in Estonia. The second 
round of the program that took place in 1994 was even more succesful (Tab. 12). 
                                              
14 Those acts are: (1) Resolution on Terms and Procedure of the Privatization of State and Municipal 
Property and (2) Resolution on the Commencement of the Sale of Shares of the State-Owned Joint-
Stock Companies. Jarosław Bauc 
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  Although at the end of 1994 due to the parliamentary election in spring 1995 
the privatization process practically stopped the list of great state owned enterprises to 
be privatized in 1995 was announced. It may be said, that it almost concludes the 
privatization of usual business enterprises and starts dismantling and sales of some 
state owned monopolies. It includes enterprises in trhe field of energy and power 
production and also in the field of transportation (including merchendise fleet, 
"Estonian Air" railroad transportation). The state owned North-Estonian Bank is also 
included into the list of enterprises to be privatized.  
  It is expected that the public sale of shares (and especially for vouchers) should 
increase in 1995. The problem is that those shares are not much attractive. Most of 
enterprises is not very profitable and the expected yield is rather low. As part of these 
enterprises are natural monopolies their activities will remain under some regulation 
even after privatization. Additionally, quite uncertain results of the parliamentary 
election make some doubts arise if the further progress in this field will be fast and 
smooth.  
7.3.4. Reprivatization 
  Problems connected with the extent and form of rehabilitation of the rights of 
former owners has in principle been treated as one of the fundamental issues in 
ownersip reform.  According to the current low in this respect the unlowful 
expropriation is interpreted rather broadly. It comprises: 
•  unlowfully nationalized property 
•  property collectivized within the collectivization and property exproprated in the 
cours of unlawful repressions during the period June 16, 1940 - June 1, 1981. 
  The objects include illegally expropriated land (with its natural objects as for 
example forrests), buildings, ships, agricultural inventory, factory fittings, shares 
excluding debts associated with them and the unreceived profit.  
  Since much of the subjects  to restitution (specially dwellings) are actually 
occupied Estonia has also followed the vaucher mechanism of compensation. These 
vauchars can be bequethed, donated to close relatives but not traded. They can be 
used in the process of privatization of sheres, land and dwellings. The value of the 
Tab.12          Large scale privatization 
 
Items 1993  1994 
Number of contracts made  54 183
Total value of sales (EEK mill.)  353.2 1151.8
Number of jobs quaranteed  9099 20339
Investments quaranteed (EEK mill)  236.8 746.8Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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alienated property will be compensated for according to value of the property at the 
time of illegal expropration. The decline or increase of the value of the property to be 
restituted will not be compensated for. The restitution and compensation process is 
arranged and decided by local governments. 
  By the end of 1993 197,228 claims of which ľ concerning farms and/or land 
were submitted for restitution or compensation. Comparing to 1.6 mill. population the 
number of claims seems enormous. In the same time 61,692 assets were reprivatized. 
7.4.  Effects of privatization    
  The structure of ownership (table 13) shows that during the first quarters of 
1993 and 1994 there was quite signifficant progress in privatization of the economy 
in terms of value added. The most important change took place for economic units 
with participation of foreign trade where the share of value added almost doubled. 
   Tab.14          The share of the private sector  
Tab.13          Value added ownership structure 
 
Ownership form  1993 IQ  
 value added 
% 
1994 IQ  
 value added 
% 
State owned  55.8  43.5 
Municipal 1.5  2.2 
Private 25.0  29.7 
Cooperatives 4.9  3.9 
Foreign owned  0.4  1.9 
With participation of foreign 
capital 
8.1 15.0 









% of total 
Industry 37.5  34.6 21.7
     Fuel and energy  8.0  2.8 14.2







Trade 83.2  78.7 21.4
Other 71.4  28.1 7.6
Total 58.8  39.6 51.3Jarosław Bauc 
CASE Foundation  - 32 - 
  The growing importance of the private sector can also be evaluated from the 
viewpoint of other measures. Analysing data from table 8 one can notice that industry 
and transport and communication are still dominated by state owned enterprises. 
Other spheres are mostly private. It is also worth stressing that less then 40% of fixed 
capital produced in 1993 58.8% of sale. This shows much greater efficiency of private 
sector comparing to the state one. 
7.5.  The agrarian reform 
  Agriculture is traditionally one of the most important sector of Estonian 
Economy. In 1992 it gave 12% of GDP and employed 14% of labour force. The food 
processing contributed to 31% of industrial output.  
  The reestablishment of private farms started in late 1980s. Priority was given 
to the former owner or his or her heirs in case of still existing buildings. Otherwise 
preferences were given to those who used the land. The farms were exempt from state 
taxes for five years after establishing the farm. 
  There were two approaches characterizing the agricultural reform. Supporters 
of evolutionary development aimed at keeping the stability of agriculture production 
based on partial preservation of large-scale farms. Others holding the view that 
agriculture should also be transferred to production based on private property 
proposed a shock therapy. In reality  the second approach was adopted. 
8.  Challenges in the future 
  There is no doubt the so far economic transformation in Estonia must be 
considered to be succesful. Very nuch liberal variant of stabilization and 
transformation has been adopted and implemented. Main points that were planned 
and realized are following: 
1.  Currency board system with fixed exchange rate and no domestic credit 
expansion, 
2.  Fiscal squeeze characterized by the balanced budget, 
3.  Low and proportional tax system (26%)  
4.  Pensions and medical care financed from extrabudgetary funds, 
5.  No fiscal and quotas restrictions on foreign trade (insignifficant exemptions), 
6.  Open capital account with no formal restrictions, 
7.  Important role of local budgets (large degree of decentralization), 
8.  Large scale of reprivatization and privatization (except big state enterprises), 
9.  Deep reorientation in foreign trade towards world markets. Estonian Way to Liberal Economic System 
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  Such a system was introduced under some peculiar conditions. First of all the 
Russian minority boycotting the parliamentary election has had no representatives 
and practically no influence on systemic changes and current policy. The government 
responsible for changes consists of right wing politicians that have exhibited 
determination and consequence in realizing very accute version of systemic reforms. 
  On the other hand, there has been a kind of social costs to be paid for these 
radical reforms. The output volume has declined considerably in agriculture, 
manufacturing and construction. The aggrarian lobby demands introducing 
protectionist measures. The labour force in manufacturing and construction consists 
to a large extend of Russian workers. Considerable inequalities in incomes have 
appeared while average purchasing power of wages have declined sharply. 
  Unemployment that was an unknown phenomenon until the end of 1991 and is 
still at a moderate rate is likely to increase in the near future as a result of a large scale 
privatization. 
  The Estonian population is rather old, fertility is low and mortality high. Per 
100 working age persons there are 40 persons under working age and 39 persons over 
the retirement age. The pensions are close to the edge of survival. Contradictions 
between aged people and young ones are being deepened 
  All those problems reflect rather low rating for govering right wing coalition. 
The favourable background of current reforms may change after new election held in 
spring 1995. Population expects improvement of the wealth level. It is then quite 
likely that this dissatisfaction may result in the growing support to left wing parties 
and eventulally result in changing the way of reforms.  
 Jarosław Bauc 
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